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THE CIA's PUBLIC OPERATIONAL FILES:
ACCESSING FILES EXEMPT FROM THE
CIA INFORMATION ACT OF 1984
BECAUSE OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO
ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITY
Hannah H. Bergman *
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, only a decade after The New York Times reported the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") was involved in a variety of illegal
domestic spying activities, including mind control experiments, Con-
gress exempted certain CIA files from search and review under the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 1 The reports in The New York
Times inspired investigations by the Rockefeller Commission, ap-
pointed by President Gerald Ford, and the Church Committee,
designated by Congress.2 These investigations concluded that for de-
cades the CIA had, used radiation and the drug lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD) in experiments on unwitting subjects in an at-
tempt to control their minds as part of a program called MKULTRA.
3
Those investigations also revealed the details of Operation
CHAOS, which began as a Johnson administration program within the
CIA for domestic spying in violation of the CIA's mandate not to con-
duct domestic operations. 4 The CIA amassed more than 13,000 files in
the program, including 7,000 on United States citizens. CHAOS fo-
* Bachelor of Journalism degree from the University of Missouri - Columbia. Mas-
ters of Arts in News Media Studies and a JD from American University, Washington
College of Law in May 2008.
1. See Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar
Force, Other Dissidents, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974 at 1.
2. Gerald K. Haines, Looking for a Rouge Elephant, STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE, 1998,
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/
studies/winter98_99/artO7.html.).
3. Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Governmental Operations, Book I, at 389-90, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., No. 94-
755 (Apr. 26, 1976) ("Church Committee"). See also, Linda Greenhouse, Justices Grant
C.I.A. Wide Discretion on Secrecy, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, April 17, 1985 at A18.
4. Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Governmental Operations, Book 3, at 688-89.
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cused primarily on Vietnam War protestors, including student
activists, street protestors, and political dissidents.5
In 1984, the CIA was also drowning in FOIA requests. 6 The
resulting backlogs meant requestors were waiting years for an answer
from the CIA to receive the requested documents. 7 The CIA insisted,
before Congress, that it had to divert its trained agents from more
pressing needs to review FOIA requests from the U.S. citizenry and,
sometimes, foreign officials.
8
The Agency had long sought a blanket exemption to FOIA; but,
Congress was reluctant to do so because witnesses before the intelli-
gence committees reminded the public of MKULTRA and CHAOS. 9 In
September, the CIA won some relief from FOIA in the form of the CIA
Information Act of 1984.10 The Act exempted the CIA's operational
files from search and review under FOIA, except in cases where those
files had been subject to an investigation.11 The committees added the
limitation on the exemption to ensure programs such as MKULTRA
and CHAOS would not be hidden from the public in the dark reaches of
the Agency.
12
Today, the CIA refuses to abide by Congress' intent. It rou-
tinely refuses to search its operational files - particularly the ones
which have been subject to an investigation and which Congress in-
tended to be public. An examination of legislative history behind the
1984 Act focusing on arguments CIA officials made before Congres-
5. Id. at Book 3, 688-89, 695.
6. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, Part pt 1, at 10 (1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generally, Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency
Exemptions, Before the Subcomm. on Government Information and Individual Rights of the
H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R. 6588, The National Intelligence Act
of 1980 Before the Subcomm. On Legis., of the H. Comm. on Intelligence, Select, 96th Cong.
(1980); Freedom of Information Act, Vol. 1 and 2 Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Intelligence Reform Act of 1981 Before the S.
Comm. on Intelligence, Select. 97th Cong. (1981); S. 1324, An Amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947 Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, Select, 98th Cong. (1983);
Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the Central
Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on Intelligence, Select.
98th Cong. (1984); CIA Information Act Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice,
and Agriculture, H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. (1984).
10. CIA Information Act of 1984, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (2007).
11. Id.
12. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, Select. 98th Cong. 33 (1984); S. 1324, An Amendment to the National Security
Act of 1947 Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, Select, 98th Cong. 21 (1983).
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sional committees while pushing for the Act's passage will reveal
Congressional efforts to minimize the possible harmful effects of the
law. Further exploring the effect of the Act will illustrate the problems
CIA officials promised the legislation would solve. Finally, looking at
interpretations of the investigation exemption by courts and the CIA
will make the courts struggle with the Act's interpretation apparent.
THE ORIGINS OF THE 1984 ACT: TRADING FOIA RELIEF
FOR QUICKER PROCESSING
The CIA, in early years of Ronald Reagan's presidency, wanted
immunity from the "bothersome" Freedom of Information Act. From
1980 until the CIA Information Act of 1984, three successive Con-
gresses held a total of eight hearings on the issue. 13 The CIA
repeatedly emphasized the Agency's need for relief from FOIA re-
quests. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), however, focused
on the requestors' needs for the CIA to release information in a more
timely fashion. The resulting 1984 legislation was a compromise be-
tween the CIA, the ACLU, and Congress.14
In its Congressional testimony, the CIA asserted five argu-
ments for relief from FOIA requests: two were substantive and three
were administrative or procedural. The substantive arguments
stressed the burden that such requests generated on the Agency's in-
telligence gathering activities and the risks encountered by the use of
FOIA by foreign governments. The administrative and procedural ar-
guments focused on the Agency's growing backlog of FOIA requests,
the costs of processing these requests, and the minimal likelihood that
operational files could ever be made public under FOIA for national
security reasons. Ultimately, the administrative and procedural argu-
ments, rather than the substantive were what won Congressional
support. These procedural arguments appeared convincing to the
13. See generally,- Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency
Exemptions, Before the Subcomm. on Government Information and Individual Rights of the
H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R. 6588, The National Intelligence Act
of 1980 Before the Subcomm. On Legis., of the H. Comm. on Intelligence, Select, 96th Cong.
(1980); Freedom of Information Act, Vol. 1 and 2 Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Intelligence Reform Act of 1981 Before the S.
Comm. on Intelligence, Select. 97th Cong. (1981); S. 1324, An Amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947 Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, Select, 98th Cong. (1983);
Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the Central
Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on Intelligence, Select.
98th Cong. (1984); CIA Information Act Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice,
and Agriculture, H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. (1984).
14. See 130 Cong. Rec. S27787-89.
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ACLU, the Agency's long-time opponent and thus formed the basis for
the compromise. However, the merits of both of these categories of
arguments require further analysis.
The CIA says responding to FOIA requests is a burden on the
Agency's intelligence gathering activities.
The CIA's strongest substantive argument was that responding
to FOIA requests burdened the CIA's primary purpose of gathering
and analyzing intelligence information. The Agency said intelligence
sources feared their identities would be revealed in response to a FOIA
request. 15 For example, John McMahon, the CIA deputy director of
intelligence, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the
presumption under FOIA that the CIA's files were open was troubling
to sources. 16 "It is virtually impossible for most of our agents and
sources... to understand the law itself, much less why the CIA opera-
tional files, in which their identities are revealed, should be subject to
the Act," McMahon testified.1 7 "It is difficult, therefore, to convince one
who is secretly cooperating with us that some day he will not awaken
to find in a U.S. newspaper or magazine an article which identifies him
as a spy," he told the Senators.' 8
McMahon went on to explain that although the CIA may be able
to withhold records under the national security exemptions to FOIA,
sources often did not understand that distinction. 19 Other foreign in-
telligence services with whom the CIA worked were also confused.
20
Despite the CIA's best efforts, this argument appeared to have little
sway over Congress. The House committee report found these fears
were "not warranted," though the committee did concede the percep-
tion among sources may be different. 2 ' Moreover, it is unclear how
McMahon intended to explain to foreign sources with sophisticated
FOIA knowledge why the limited exceptions the bills were offering
would protect them. Thus, in interpreting the statute today, the bur-
den on the CIA's intelligence gathering activities should not be given
much weight.
15. S. 1324, An Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 Before the S. Comm.
on Intelligence, Select, 98th Cong. 6 (1983).
16. Id.




21. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 17.
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The possibility FOIA could be abused by foreign governments
distresses the CIA.
Current and former CIA officials played on the fear that FOIA
laws could allow foreign governments access to information the United
States wanted to keep secret. Such fears appeared reasonable during
the Cold War and in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis. The CIA in
the early 1980s received a FOIA request from the Ayatollah Khomeini,
now the Supreme Leader of Iran, for information on the Shah of Iran.
22
The Agency and perhaps many of the Senators found this request
loathsome.23 CIA officials also told Congress that KGB agents, secret
Russian police during the communist era, could request information
under FOIA. 24 The fear of "legal espionage" by the Soviet Union effec-
tively invoked the atmosphere of the Cold War.25 Interestingly, no one
pressed the CIA on why the Agency was actively trying to protect such
files when the KGB may not have known these files existed, but for the
publicity the CIA was generating. Today, as in 1984, many requesters
hire others to make FOIA requests for them, effectively hiding the
identity of the beneficiary of the information. Thus, the concern that
information will be utilized by individuals unfriendly toward the
United States is really as scare meant to divert attention from the pur-
pose of open government laws.
The Agency's backlog of FOIA requests is sizeable because many files
that can never be released for national security reasons have
to be searched and reviewed before the Agency can
deny the request.
Despite these more substantive arguments, the most powerful
argument in the Agency's arsenal was the existence of a massive back-
log of FOIA requests - a backlog that the ACLU and Congress also
wanted to eliminate. The House Select Committee on Intelligence
found in its report, "The review necessary for documents found in the
Directorate of Operations is the primary cause of the overall CIA back-
log in responding to FOIA requests."26 The CIA processed requests in
a first in, first out basis which was the only form of processing allowed
22. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 27.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id. In this statement legal espionage means the KGB could commit espionage by
gaining information that was publically available under the FOIA
26. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 10.
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before the 1996 amendments to FOIA. This meant that requests for
dozens of records in the Directorate of Operations files would often
slow down processing of smaller, simpler requests.27 Often the most
sensitive operational files had to be reviewed line by line by exper-
ienced Agency professionals to determine if any portion of the files
could be released without harming national security.28 By exempting
some of the Directorate of Operations files from release under FOIA,
Congress reasoned that other requests would be filled more quickly.
Although all files would still have to be reviewed, less time would be
spent looking at the operational files that in most cases could never be
released.
29
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence agreed with the
House's assessment. Senator Patrick Leahy, a member of the commit-
tee at that time and now the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
said during the hearings in 1983, "the search and review of operational
files... is causing a major backlog in responding to FOIA requests,
including those which would otherwise result in the release of useful
information." According to Senator Leahy, the backlog at that time
was more than 2,500 requests and it took about two years between the
time of a request and the receipt of a denial or the requested files.
30
However, the House had a more optimistic vision of the numbers. It
found the CIA received 1,266 new FOIA requests in 1983, which gave
the Agency at year end a backlog of 1,711 requests. 31 This was up 351
requests from 1982.32
Congress expected the relief to be dramatic. "The Committee
firmly expects that CIA final responses to FOIA requesters after enact-
ment of H.R. 5164 will be measured in months at the outside, not in
years, and that the CIA will redouble its efforts to meet the deadlines
established in FOIA," according to the House report. 33 In turn, "the
Committee views this substantial reduction in CIA response time as a
primary benefit of this bill."34 Thus, today when interpreting the CIA's
actions with regard to FOIA processing and requests for operational
files, it is important to consider whether the Agency is following
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 3.
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through on its assurances to Congress. If the Agency is not fulfilling
its obligations, the continued benefit of the Act should be questioned.
The cost of processing FOIA requests also burdens the CIA.
In Congressional testimony, McMahon explored the costs of ad-
ministering FOIA through 1983. Just seven years after FOIA was
enacted, the CIA had spent $21 million processing FOIA requests. 35 At
the same time, the Agency collected only $76,000 in fees. 36 Part of
these costs was presumably ascribed to the hours of work required to
search through the CIA's files and compile the records. Unlike other
government agencies that relied on staff trained for searching and re-
viewing, the CIA diverted case officers from their normal job duties to
compile and review the materials for release.37 This practice would
have inflated the processing costs because trained intelligence agents
would cost the Agency more than the average FOIA officer. The cost to
the CIA today to search its files should be considered in this context,
and where the burden is less for various administrative reasons it is
more important that the CIA fulfills its obligations.
The CIA said there was a slim likelihood operational files could ever
be made public because of national security concerns.
Finally, the CIA argued despite the delays and costs associated
with the review, the Agency rarely, if ever, released information in op-
erational files. 38 Essentially, the review of operational files occurred
only so that the Agency could deny FOIA requests. Information that
was released from the operational files was often so fragmented it was
of no use to the requester. This was in an essence a denial of the
request.39
McMahon explained to the House intelligence committee that
the documents were "scrutinized line by line, word by word, by highly
skilled operational personnel who have the necessary training and ex-
perience to identify source revealing or other sensitive information."40
The agents worked under the assumption any information released
35. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 11.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id.
40. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, Select. 98th Cong. 8 (1984).
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could be combined with other information and used against the United
States. 41 "After the responsive records have been properly reviewed,
the public derives little or nothing by way of meaningful information
from the fragmentary items or occasional isolated paragraph," McMa-
hon concluded.
42
McMahon explained the CIA was not comfortable releasing
even this amount of information; the black markings could have been
misplaced, the agent could have missed the significance of one piece of
information that was released. "As long as the process of FOIA search
and review of CIA operational files continues, this possibility of error
cannot be eradicated." The harm done to the Agency's mission by such
errors is, of course, unknowable and incalculable. The potential harm
is, in our judgment, extreme," McMahon told Congress. 43 When con-
sidering the Agency's decisions to release information from its
operational files, it is important to consider whether that information
has already been released in some form. When the Agency has been
careless with its information, it should be allowed to assert that its
release would not be in keeping with the 1984 Act.
Nevertheless, though the CIA marshalled several arguments
for relief under FOIA, the reduction in the backlog was easiest to un-
derstand and the most tangible. This argument convinced, even the
Agency's longtime opponents that FOIA processing would improve if
the exemption for operational files was granted. However, Congress
remained somewhat skeptical about the CIA's genuineness. Congress
extracted promises from the CIA that staff devoted to FOIA processing
and other resources would not diminish for at least two years until the
backlog was improved. 44 Congress also received assurances that an ex-
emption for the CIA would not simply be the first of many for the
intelligence gathering agencies.
45
THE CIA's FOIA RELIEF DID NOT HAVE THE EFFECT
CONGRESS INTENDED
Congress was right to remain skeptical that the exemption the
CIA received would reduce processing times of FOIA requests and
Agency backlogs. Twenty-three years after the passage of the Act, the
CIA's backlog is still significant, if it is even considered to be an appro-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id.
44. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 11.
45. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 25.
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priate measure of the Agency's workload. The Agency's FOIA related
expenses have more than doubled. The Act has been viewed as a model
for several similar FOIA exemptions for other intelligence agencies.
Moreover, the CIA has failed to abide by the limitations of the 1984 Act
and search files which the Act did not protect.
The CIA's current backlog is sizable.
The CIA's backlog, along with backlogs in other federal agen-
cies, is frequently examined by a variety of nonprofit groups.
Invariably, the CIA ranks among the agencies with the greatest
backlogs and has the oldest pending requests. According to the Na-
tional Security Archive's 2005 study of the 10 Oldest Pending FOIA
Requests across 64 government agencies, the CIA was responsible for
four, despite handling only 0.08 percent of FOIA requests to the federal
government. 46 Those requests include: one made in 1989 for records
related to the bombing of Pan American Flight 103, a 1990 request
(initially made in 1987) for records related to Jonathan Pollard, a for-
mer U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer convicted of being an Israeli agent,
a 1991 request for records related to Regan-era National Security Deci-
sion Directive 112, and a 1991 request for specific and detailed
information related to the Pan-American bombing.47 At the age of 18,
the oldest pending request at the CIA can now join the Army and vote;
this is undoubtedly not what Congress intended when it predicted that
because of the 1984 Act, processing time would be measured in
months.48
Perhaps even more important, the CIA's year-end backlog over
the last several years has been considerable. In fiscal year 1998, the
Agency's backlog of pending requests was 4,716; in 2002, it was 1,547;
and in 2006, it was 896.49 Prior to the 1984 Act, the backlog was be-
tween 1,700 and 2,500 requests. 50 While the backlog is currently less
than it was when the 1984 Act was passed, government agencies were
not required to report data on FOIA processing until FOIA was
amended in 1996. Therefore, it is not possible to know what happened




49. COALITION OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, THE WAITING GAME: FOIA
PERFORMANCE HITS NEW Lows (2007), http://www.cjog.netldocumentsLFOIAPerformance_
ReportPart l.pdf.
50. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 11.
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to the CIA's processing times in the intermediary period between the
1984 law and the effect of the 1996 amendments.
Still, there are other disturbing trends in the data which indi-
cate the backlog may not be a true measure of the CIA's current
workload. The CIA is denying a greater number of requests than previ-
ously, a process which is more expeditious than granting requests,
because it does require the extensive review of each fragment of infor-
mation for release. This could have the effect of decreasing the backlog
without fulfilling the spirit of increased access to information. For ex-
ample, in 1998, the Agency fully denied 13.3 percent of requests it
received, and partially denied 23 percent. 51 In 2002, the Agency fully
denied 17 percent, while partially denying 32.8 percent. 52 In 2006, the
Agency fully denied 19.2 percent, while partially denying 36.4 per-
cent.53 Over six years, this is a steady increase in partial and full
denials; when the number of requests the CIA received dropped 59 per-
cent. Therefore, the Agency's backlog reduction should be viewed with
skepticism, particularly when analyzing the Agency's credibility.
In addition, the CIA's FOIA processing costs remain high, de-
spite hopes the exclusion of operational files from search and review
would reduce expenses. In 2006, the CIA reported it had 75 employees
devoted to FOIA fulfilling the 2,579 requests it received. 54 The Agency
spent $8.8 million on FOIA in FY 2006.5 5 By comparison, FOIA costs
averaged $3 million a year before the 1984 Act.5 6 Accounting for infla-
tion, that is still more than a $2 million increase.
57
Indeed, this coupled with processing times still measured in
years according to the National Security Archive study, makes it un-
certain as to what impact the 1984 Act had. While the CIA's response
time to requests is now technically measured in days, the CIA is only
required to acknowledge receipt of a request and can report that data
as a response time. 58 Thus, there is no way to measure the time it
51. CIA, FY 98 FOIA REPORT (1998), http://www.foia.cia.gov/txt/annual-report_1998.
pdf.
52. CIA, FY 02 FOIA REPORT (2002), http://www.foia.cia.gov/txtlannual-report_2002.
pdf.
53. CIA, FY 06 FOIA REPORT (2006), http://www.foia.cia.gov/txt/annual-report_2006.
pdf.
54. COALITION OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, THE WAITING GAME: FOIA
PERFORMANCE HITS NEW Lows, supra note 28.
55. Id.
56. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 11.
57. CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
58. COALITION OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, THE WAITING GAME: FOIA
PERFORMANCE HITS NEW Lows, supra note 28.
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actually takes to fulfill a FOIA request without making a FOIA request
for that information. 59
The CIA's exemption for operational files has led to a proliferation
among intelligence agencies of identical exemptions.
During Congressional hearings on the 1984 Act, members re-
peatedly emphasized they did not want this relief for the CIA to turn
into a barrage of requests from other intelligence agencies for the same
legislation. Senator Leahy, a member of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee, was particularly interested in this point, saying, "I made it very
clear that I did not want this bill to be a prelude to an attempt to gain a
generalized exemption from FOIA for the FBI, the NSA, DIA or any
other intelligence agency. The testimony was clear that this bill is just
for the particular situation of the CIA."60 McMahon, the CIA's deputy
director, tried to reassure him, replying, "there would be no further
efforts from the intelligence community for such a bill and the adminis-
tration would not support any additional efforts."61
McMahon's statement proved to be a false assurance. President
Reagan's signing statement read in part, "I anticipate that in the fu-
ture such relief will be expanded in scope. And I expect that it will
become available to other agencies involved in intelligence, who also
must protect their sources and methods, and who likewise wise to
avoid unnecessary and expensive paperwork."62 President Reagan's
expectation has been fulfilled: the National Security Agency, the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency have each received similar ex-
emptions. 63 These exemptions have passed as part of defense spending
bills without hearings or floor debate.
As a result, these new exemptions lack any legislative history.
Thus, the legislative history surrounding the CIA's FOIA relief re-
mains relevant to the interpretation of these newer exemptions. The
language of these exemptions is almost exactly the same as the 1984
59. See The National Security Archive, A FOIA Request Celebrates its 17th Birthday
(2006), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB182/tenoldest.htm (describing
that this is how the National Security Archive conducts its 10 Oldest Audit).
60. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 25, 51.
61. Id. at 25.
62. 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1543.
63. See 50 USC § 40c-53 (2007) (exempting the National Reconnaissance Office), 50
USC § 403-5c (exempting the National Geospatial Agency (then the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency)); 50 USCS § 432c (exempting the Defense Intelligence Agency); 50 USCS
§ 432b (exempting the National Security Agency).
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Act; therefore leading courts to turn to the 1984 Act's legislative his-
tory in interpreting the similar exemptions. 64 By fully understanding
what Congress intended with respect to the 1984 Act, the courts and
the intelligence agencies themselves can now understand what these
later laws are intended to protect.
However, some concerns expressed during the debates over the
CIA's 1984 Act may not be relevant to the exemptions obtained by
other agencies. For example, Congress likely had a different motiva-
tion for granting an exemption to agencies, such as the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The NRO does not have the same FOIA
backlogs as the CIA. The NRO only received 121 requests for the 2006
fiscal years and had a backlog of a mere 18 requests. 65 Since the
NRO's workload is substantially less than the CIA's workload, Con-
gress could not have hoped to speed processing times by granting its
operational files exemption from FOIA. At the same time, because
other agencies that have received operational files protection are com-
ponents of the Defense Department, specific numbers related to their
FOIA backlogs are not available. 66 This makes it impossible to evalu-
ate the administrative needs for FOIA relief or the effect of such relief
for the agencies on the requestors. Still, while it is not possible to
glean Congressional intent in the latest round of exemptions, Con-
gress' decision to use the same language in these separate laws
indicates they should be interpreted the same by the courts. It would
be a fallacy for the courts to hold that the same language in two sepa-
rate statutes designed to protect the same information - but for the
fact that the information is maintained by two different agencies -
should be mean wholly different things.
The CIA's recent interpretation of the 1984 Act differs greatly from
Congress' interpretation of the language in 1984.
Congress worked diligently to ensure that some CIA opera-
tional files would remain subject to FOIA by adding language to the
original bill. This required the CIA to continue to search those files
which were the "specific subject matter of an investigation by the intel-
ligence committees of the Congress, the Intelligence Oversight Board,
the Department of Justice, the Office of General Counsel of the Central
64. See Aftergood v. NRO, 441 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44 n.8 (D.D.C. 2006).
65. NRO, FY 06 FOIA REPORT (2006), http://www.nro.gov/foia/Annual_Report_2006.
pdf.
66. See 5 USCS § 552 (2007) (requiring under for FOLA agencies to aggregate data, but
not break it out into requests components received).
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Intelligence Agency, the Office of Inspector General of the Central In-
telligence Agency, or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presiden-
tial directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity."67 This
language was meant to assure Congress that evidence of illegal activi-
ties, such as MKULTRA or Project CHAOS would still come to light,
and was added over objections by the CIA that it was not necessary.
While these CIA transgressions are a faint memory today, other recent
CIA troubles surrounding the military operations in Iraq and Afghani-
stan reinforce the need for public scrutiny of the Agency. Moreover,
any calls for a new interpretation of the law in light of the War on
Terror and the events on September 11, 2001 should be weighed
against the context of the Cold War and recent Iranian hostage crisis
in which Congress passed 1984 Act. Indeed, at the House Intelligence
Committee hearings, Representative Louis Stokes questioned the De-
partment of Justice's intelligence policy counsel on this point, saying,
"Some of us are concerned about the revelation of certain improper ac-
tions that took place on the part of the agencies back in the 1950's and
1960's and even the 1970's."68 Additionally, in the Senate hearings too,
Senator Walter Huddleston focused on this point. Senator Huddleston
asked McMahon specifically about MKULTRA and CHAOS wondering
whether the operational files, as they related to the abuse, would be
subject to search and review. 69 McMahon told the Senate committee,
"that the very process of the abuse being reported would create a sepa-
rate set of files outside of the operational files, which would be subject
to FOIA."70 Thus, there would be no more hindrance than before the
legislation to releasing that information.7 1 The Department of Justice
counsel likewise assured the House.
7 2
Yet, the senators pressed this point. Senator Barry Goldwater,
then the chairman of the Intelligence Committee asked, "Would the
CIA support an amendment which would make it clear that designated
files will be subject to search and review if they concern any intelli-
gence activity which the DCI, the Inspector General, or General
67. 50 USC § 431 (2007).
68. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, supra, note 38, at 33.
69. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 21.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, supra, note 38, at 33.
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Counsel of the Agency has reason to believe may be unlawful or con-
trary to Executive order or Presidential directive?" 73 This time, the
CIA's deputy general counsel, Ernest Mayerfield, assured the commit-
tee, "In my view such a specific item to be legislated would be
unnecessary by the very definition. If the Inspector General or the
General Counsel or the Director's office has reason to believe that
something may be unlawful, there is documentation on this particular
matter located in those files, and they are not in designated 'opera-
tional files'."74 The CIA's assurances were not enough. Eventually, the
House bill was adopted by the full Congress, which makes it clear that
operational files that were subject to an investigation are not exempt
from FOIA.
Today, however, the CIA refuses to search these operational
files and abide by the assurances the Agency gave the Intelligence
Committees more than twenty years ago. This is evidenced by the
CIA's responses to several requests from the National Security Archive
for files which were the subject of an investigation and by the court's
decision in ACLU v. DOD.
7 5
For example, in October 2006, the National Security Archive re-
quested, "the April 2002 Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the
Iraqi National Congress source that stated that the Department of
Homeland Security had terminated contact with him after four meet-
ings because of suspicions that he was a fabricator."76 This request
included a paragraph noting the requested file was previously provided
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the CIA as part of
the investigation that produced, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Com-
munity's Prewar Intelligence Assessment in Iraq." Thus, the Archive
argued the file fell under the investigation provision of section of the
1984 Act and should be released. 77 Indeed, the House report on the
1984 Act prior to its passage made clear the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee's investigation was exactly the Congress had in mind, stating:
When the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [or]
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . . . carries out an in-
vestigation for impropriety or illegality in the conduct of an
intelligence activity, all CIA files, including exempted operational
73. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 29-30.
74. Id. at 30.
75. See ACLU v. DOD, 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
76. Letters from Scott Koch, CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central
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files will remain subject to FOIA search and review for information
concerning the specific subject matter of the investigation.
78
The CIA responded to the National Security Archive on November 27,
2006:
With regard to your request, responsive records, should they exist,
would be contained in operational files. Please note that according
to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 USC § 431,
operational files of the CIA are exempt from the publication, disclo-
sure, search and review provision of the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. As such, the files that would contain responsive
records, if any exist, are not subject to search in response to your
request.
79
This denial did not address the question of whether the citation
by the Senate Intelligence Committee affected the status of the docu-
ments. However, in subsequent denials, the CIA has been more
specific.
Similarly, the National Security Archive requested files in Sep-
tember 2004 related to the interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
which were referenced in The 9/11 Commission Report. The request
was denied in December 2004. In an appeal later that month, the
Archive argued that because these documents were part of the 9/11
Commission's investigation and numerous other Congressional investi-
gations, they were not exempt from FOIA. The CIA has not ruled on
the more than two-year-old appeal, which again illustrates the
Agency's slow processing times following the 1984 Act.
However, in response to six other requests by the National Se-
curity Archive made under Executive Order 12958, which provides for
declassification of documents, the CIA has issued final decisions.
These decisions each contain a paragraph which may be a prelude to
the Agency's final decisions on the Archive's FOIA requests for opera-
tional files. This paragraph reads in part:
You note that the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Ca-
pabilities of the United State Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction cited the requested information in its report of 31
March 2005 (Silberman-Robb Commission Report). The Commis-
sion's citation of the requested information in its report does not
change the status of this information as CIA operational files that
are exempt from the search, review, publication, and disclosure re-
78. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 28.
79. Letters from Scott Koch, CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central
Intelligence Agency, to Roger Strother, National Security Archive (Mar. 7, 2007) (on file
with author).
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quirements of the FOIA and from the mandatory declassification
review provisions of Executive Order 12958, as amended.
80
Again, this suggests the CIA is not following the intent of Con-
gress, and the understanding of the Intelligence Committees that the
citation of requested information by an investigatory committee would
change the status of the operational files under the 1984 Act. How-
ever, this denial leaves several issues open for argument, as the
Agency did not explain why the citation is not status changing. While
it is true that the Silberman-Robb Commission is not an investigatory
body named within the statute, its efforts to assess the conduct of the
executive branch, particularly with regard to Iraq, are within the spirit
of what Congress intended under the 1984 Act. Moreover, other sec-
tions of the 1984 Act, which deal with the dissemination of information
from the CIA's operational files, suggest the process of sending infor-
mation to the Silberman-Robb Commission's removes the protection of
the 1984 Act.81
The National Security Archive has also requested files used by
the Senate intelligence committee in its reports on the "U.S. Intelli-
gence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq." CIA
denials of these requests say, "This report did not result from a Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter SCCI) investigation into
any impropriety or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential
directive in the conduct of intelligence activity." Therefore, the CIA
says it believes the requests cannot be fulfilled. The Senate intelli-
gence committee's purpose in releasing these reports is admittedly
difficult to ascertain. There are no Congressional Record or news
statements by the committee members that shed light on this, nor are
the reports so damning that they were obviously the result of investi-
gations into illegal activity. Moreover, there is not a definitions section
within the statute to turn to for clarity on what constitutes an investi-
gation, impropriety, or illegal activity.
Yet, from the plain language of the statute and the introduction
of the Senate intelligence committee's report there is a strong argu-
ment that it was investigating at the minimum improper activity.
Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV,
said the committee was to examine, among other things, "the objectiv-
ity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments
reached by the Intelligence Community."8 2 This would include assess-
80. Id.
81. 50 USC § 431 (d)(1)-(3) (2007).
82. S. REP. No. 108-301, at 1 (2004).
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ing "whether those judgments were properly disseminated to
policymakers in the executive branch and Congress" and "whether any
influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to sup-
port policy objectives."8 3 The failure to inform Congress, particularly
the intelligence committees, of crucial information regarding weapons
of mass destruction is improper protocol within the government. It is
also a violation of 1991 amendments to the National Security Act
which requires the White House to keep the intelligence committees
"fully and currently informed" of intelligence activities.8 4 Equally
problematic would be influencing intelligence information to support
political goals. Thus, the National Security Archive has several strong
arguments to challenge the CIA's denials of its requests.
Beyond the National Security Archive's requests, the CIA has
also denied the requests of the American Civil Liberties Union. In
2005, U.S. District Court Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein ordered the CIA
to search its operational files for records related to the "treatment of
Detainees in United States custody," their "deaths," and "their rendi-
tion to countries known to employ torture" after finding the ACLU's
request fell within the investigation exemptions to the 1984 Act.85 The
ACLU argued these files were part of the CIA Office of Inspector Gen-
eral's investigation into incidents in Iraq, a concession the CIA made in
its briefs. 86 Yet, the Agency argued it should not be required to search
its files, because the investigation was ongoing.8 7 Judge Hellerstein
ruled against the CIA on this point, holding the statute itself said noth-
ing related to the timing of an investigation.8
In dicta, Judge Hellerstein went further stating that because
the CIA had already began its investigation into improprieties in Iraq,
the files in the relevant operational files had been searched, and those
documents were now in the Inspector General's files.8 9 Thus, there
could be "no additional material burden in searching and reviewing the
documents already in the inspector general's files."90 In addition,
under the reasoning of CIA officials, who testified before Congress as
the 1984 Act was debated, these files would no longer be correctly
83. Id.
84. 50 USCS § 431 (2007).
85. See ACLU v. DOD, 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86. Id. at 272.
87. Id. at 271.
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termed operational files and should be released. Citing this testimony,
Judge Hellerstein concluded:
The legislative history reinforces the clearly expressed intent of sec-
tion 431(c)(3) to require that the CIA search and review its
information produced or gathered 'concerning ... the specific sub-
ject matter' of the investigation, for public release, or specific
exemption under FOIA. The documents in question need not actu-
ally have been reviewed and relied upon by the OIG staff, and the
CIA may not delay compliance until such time, if ever, an investiga-
tion is closed. 91
This language could be a powerful citation in future arguments against
the CIA.
The CIA is failing on two fronts and there is ample opportunity for
litigation on the Agency's actions.
Thus, the CIA's denial of the National Security Archive's and
ACLU's requests shows the Agency refuses to obey the 1984 law in two
crucial ways. The Agency is not making initial searches of operational
files which have been subject to an investigation, as the 1984 Act re-
quires. Furthermore, when operational files have been searched
during an investigation and the responsive documents have been
moved to investigatory files, the Agency is not searching those files in
response to requests. There has been little litigation surrounding the
CIA's behavior. Thus, the bounds of the 1984 Act are somewhat un-
clear and worth exploring in significant detail.
UNDERSTANDING THE LANGUAGE AND THE MEANING OF THE
INVESTIGATON ExEMPTION
The 1984 Act is neither long nor elaborately constructed. The
premise of the law is straightforward: the CIA maintains operational
files which contain secret information about how the Agency conducts
its work, and those files are almost never able to be made public. Thus,
in most situations, the CIA will not have to search operational files in
response to a FOIA request, and the courts will have limited power to
review this decision. In this construction, however, there are several
key definitions included: "operational files", the "specific subject mat-
ter" of an investigation, who may conduct the investigation, and
finally, the power of the court to review the CIA's actions, with regard
to the 1984 Act.
91. Id. at 276-77.
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The definition of operational files under the 1984 Act has not been
given significant attention.
Foremost, is the issue of what constitutes operational files
within the meaning of the 1984 Act. The statute defines these files as:
(1) files of the Directorate of Operations which document the con-
duct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations or
intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information ex-
changes with foreign governments or their intelligence or security
services;
(2) files of the Directorate for Science and Technology which docu-
ment the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
is collected through scientific and technical systems; and
(3) files of the Office of Personnel Security which document investi-
gations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources; except that files which
are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence are not opera-
tional files. 9
2
In the two key cases dealing with "operational files," the courts
have not dwelled on the question of what constitutes an operational
file. Indeed, in Aftergood v. NR0 93, the court specifically declined to
decide whether the file at issue was an operational file. There, the
plaintiff requested the "unclassified portions of the NRO Congressional
Budget Justification Book ("CBJB") for Fiscal Year 2006."9 4 The
budget book was designated by the head of the National Reconnais-
sance Office as an operational file, but the plaintiff argued it could not
be "operational" in nature. The file did not "document the means by
which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through
scientific and technical means," but rather was produced to inform
Congress of the NRO's work so its funding requests could be met.
95
However, the court decided the case based on another exception to op-
erational files exemption. The exemption provides that records which
had been released from operational files are no longer exempt if they
have been referenced in files that are not exempt and now are only
maintained in operational files for retention purposes. 96 Finding this,
92. 50 USC § 431 (2007).
93. Aftergood v. NRO, 441 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (following that because the
National Reconnaissance Office's operational files exemption to FOIA is a mirror of the
CIA's, the court's reasoning is relevant to interpretation of the 1984 Act).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 46.
2008 117
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
the court declined to address whether the files were truly "operational"
at all.
97
The National Security Archive cited the court's decision in
Aftergood in its recent requests to the CIA for operational files it be-
lieved should be released under the investigation exemption. In the
letters referred to above in response to mandatory declassification re-
quests, the CIA said:
Similarly, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in Aftergood v. National Reconnaissance Office, 441
F.Supp. 2d 37 (2006), to which you cite, is limited by the facts of the
case to the National Reconnaissance Office and does not change the
status of the requested documents as CIA operational files that are
exempt from the search, review, publication, and disclosure re-
quirements of the FOIA and from mandatory declassification
review provisions of the Executive Order.98
This language is troubling because the NRO's operational files
exemption mirrors the CIA's and court's interpretation of the language
should be acceptable by the CIA as at least offering guidance, if not
controlling.
Also, in ACLU v. DOD, the court did not address the question of
whether the pictures in question were properly considered "operational
files." Indeed, the court did little more than quote the same statutory
language and then move on to a discussion of whether the CIA followed
proper procedure in designating the requested files as "operational."99
Given this lack of thorough judicial interpretation and the
courts' fondness for the 1984 Act's legislative history in both the
Aftergood and ACLU cases, it is again useful to turn to the Congres-
sional hearings and reports. 100 The House report, in its section by
section analysis of the bill, explains "only those files concerning intelli-
gence sources and methods are comprehended by the definition of
'operational files." 10 1 The report goes on to explain that it is not the
final intelligent product which would be considered operational, but
97. Id. at 41.
98. Letters from Scott Koch, CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central
Intelligence Agency, to Roger Strother, National Security Archive (Mar. 7, 2007) (on file
with author).
99. See ACLU v. DOD, supra note 80, at 271.
100. The National Security Archive's amicus brief in Aftergood v. NRO focused on this
question, arguing: "Indeed the wide reach of the agency's designations suggest that the
NRO has interpreted the term "operational files" so broadly as to mean simply any files that
document or concern in any way how the NRO operates, but this cannot be what Congress
intended when it granted the NRO exception."
101. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, supra note 6, at 20-1.
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the process by which that product was complied, such as the identities
of the Agency's sources, the technical means used, and the manage-
ment of these means, would be an operational file.' 0 2 Hence, files can
be designated as exempt if they illustrate the conduct of foreign intelli-
gence operations, counterintelligence operations, intelligence
agreements, the means by which the operations are conducted, and in-
vestigations into the suitability of potential agents.' 0 3
The Senate report offers a similar analysis of the designating
files as "operational." The report also explains that for the most part
the administrative and management files of the Operations Director-
ate will be considered "operational," because they will "directly concern
sources and methods" of the CIA. 10 4 However, when these files are re-
lied on by policymakers or Agency executives, the Senate report says
copies of the files will be made; thus it follows that the files will be
accessible under FOIA through the other non-operational files of the
Agency.105
An appendix to the House hearing also offers insight into what
was meant by "operational files." The House Intelligence Committee
asked the CIA to respond to fifty scenarios in which files had been pre-
viously released by informing the committee of the availability of the
files under the proposed amendment. 10 6 Many of these scenarios de-
scribe memos sent to CIA employees, memos sent between the CIA and
other agencies, documents describing the organization of the CIA's of-
fices, or memos between these offices. In almost all of these situations,
the CIA responded by saying the files were contained in the Executive
Registry, and thus would continue to be subject to FOIA. Therefore, at
the very least, it is clear the CIA considered correspondence as non-
operational and still accessible under FOIA.
Thus, the legislative history indicates that the definition of op-
erational files was meant to be a narrow one. Indeed, the Senate report
also notes that for the most part these files would have fallen under an
already existing exemption to FOIA. To construe "operational files" as
any files of the Agency would be a gross misunderstanding of the nar-
row construction of the statute.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. S. REP. No. 98-305, at 22 (1984).
105. Id.
106. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, supra, note 38, at 100-09 (1984). S. Rep. No. 98-305 at 114-126 (1984).
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The meaning of "specific subject matter" is crucial to properly
framing a request.
The second important part of the statutory language concerns
the phrase "specific subject matter" of an investigation. This language
was at issue in the case Davy v. CIA, 10 7 where the plaintiff, an author,
requested information related to alleged CIA contact Clay Shaw. 08
The plaintiff believed that the requested files of Project QKENCHANT
and Project ZRCLIFF would show that Clay Shaw was a CIA contact
involved in Cuban operations. 10 9 This information, the plaintiff con-
tended, should be released because the investigations by various
Congressional committees, the CIA's general counsel and the Warren
Commission into President Kennedy's assassination touched on Clay
Shaw, the subject of his request." 0 The court disagreed, noting that
the plaintiffs FOIA request was about the two projects and not Clay
Shaw."' The court found those two projects were never the subject of
an investigation; thus the information could not be released.
In dicta, the court also maintained, "[m]oreover, even if Davy
had put forth evidence tending to show that these CIA projects were
somehow tangentially related to the Kennedy assassination, 'a con-
gressional investigation that touches on CIA conduct in a particular
incident or region, standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant the re-
lease of all CIA documents' regarding such an incident or region."" 2
Here, the court relied on language from Sullivan v. CIA," 3 a 1993 case
in which the plaintiff requested information about her father, whom
she believed disappeared while dropping U.S. government propaganda
over Cuba. 11
4
In Sullivan, the plaintiff argued the Church Committee, which
inquired "into certain covert operations against Cuba mounted by the
CIA and other (putatively independent) anti-Castro groups," made the
CIA's files on her father the "specific subject matter of an investigation
by an intelligence committee of the Congress... for any impropriety, or
violation of law... in the conduct of an intelligence activity."" 5 The
107. Davy v. CIA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D. D.C. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 82.
111. Id. at 83.
112. Id. at 82.
113. Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1254-55.
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court did not agree with her, holding, "[tihe congressional investigation
and the documents sought must specifically relate to CIA wrongdoing,
that is, some 'impropriety' or 'violation of law' in the conduct of the
designated intelligence activity."
116
Indeed, the Church Committee was concerned with investigat-
ing a relationship between the assassination of President Kennedy and
any operations against Cuba. "Seen from that perspective, the Com-
mittee's mission does not fit within the contours of section 431(c)(3) for
two reasons. First, the Committee's inquiry was not a direct investiga-
tion into CIA wrongdoing. Second, appellant's request for information
about her father's disappearance bears no claimed or readily discerni-
ble relationship to the investigation's purposes."
11 7
The court explained:
This latter obstacle is insurmountable: a pivotal requirement of sec-
tion 431(c)(3) is that, to be extractable, the information requested
must concern the specific subject matter of the official investiga-
tion. Thus, although there were instances in which the Committee
searched for agency misconduct, that happenstance does not allow
appellant to catapult herself over the statutory parapet. It is simply
not enough that information which bore in some remote way on the
request surfaced in the course of an official investigation.'1 8
This court also cited to the legislative history, in particular the
House report. Again, on this point, the legislative history is clear. It
explains the "specific subject matter of the investigation" language was
meant to tailor the information still subject to FOIA, avoiding an "ex-
pansive" interpretation of the provision." 9 The report also offers a
helpful example of this language in action.' 20 The Intelligence Over-
sight Board could investigate illegal surveillance activity conducted by
the Agency. 12' If the CIA received FOIA request for information re-
lated to that investigation, the Agency would have to release files.'
22
But, if the CIA received a request for information about the target of
the investigation, the CIA would not have to search its operational
files. 12
3
However, the appendix to the House hearings also illuminates
the Church Committee's investigation. The House Intelligence Com-
116. Id. at 1255.
117. Id. at 1249.
118. Id. at 1255.
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mittee asked whether files related to President Nixon's decision in
1969 and 1970 to order "destruction of existing stockpiles of biological
and toxic weapons" would be accessible under the new bill.124 The
files included press releases, CIA documents listing the contents of the
Agency's biological arsenal, and the text of international agreements
prohibiting development and use of such weapons. 125 In response, the
CIA said, "CIA biological weapons were the subject of investigation by
the Church Committee and it is likely that the documents described in
this category were relied upon in the course of the investigation.
Therefore, these documents would be accessible. ... "1 26 In fact, the offi-
cial name of the Church Committee was the "United States Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities." Together, the title and the CIA's response to
the question suggest the scope of the Church Committee's investiga-
tions may have been much wider than the court in Davy portrayed it.
This illustrates the importance of carefully framing both a
FOIA request and the description of the investigation in which the
records would have been relied on. To narrow a vision of the investiga-
tion can be a death blow to the request. For this reason, it appears
that the plaintiff in Sullivan would have been better served by request-
ing CIA files related to the Church Committee's investigation into its
operations in Cuba. After receiving these files, she then could have
searched them for information on her father. But by narrowing her
request, she could not take advantage of the Act's exemptions. The
same might be said for the plaintiff in Davy. Had he requested infor-
mation directly related to the Warren Commission or another
committee's investigation into Kennedy's assassination, his request
may have been treated differently. Instead, he narrowly requested in-
formation about specific CIA projects he thought the investigatory
bodies had relied on and that he believed would contain information
about Clay Shaw. Thus, requesting more information than needed
seems to be necessary to avail oneself of the exemptions to the 1984
Act.
However, there is a strong policy argument to be made in re-
sponse to this tactic. It neither serves the requester's interest to ask for
more information than the individual needs nor does it serve the CIA's
limited FOIA resources or its apparent desires to control the release of
124. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, supra, note 38, at 125.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 120.
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its files to be forced to provide more information. The requester may
have limited resources to pay the CIA search and duplication fees. The
request may also take substantially longer to process because of the
broader scope. This would increase the CIA's backlog in clear contra-
vention of Congress's expressed wishes when it passed the 1984 Act.
But this appears, in some cases, to be the only way to obtain informa-
tion. This theory might be tested by two requestors making parallel
requests - one for only the information the individual needed and the
other for a large amount of files related to an investigation in which
the information desired would be contained.
Defining who is an appropriate investigator under the statute is the
key to releasing information.
There has been relatively little litigation addressing who may
conduct an investigation for purposes of the exemption. The language
of the statute lists several possibilities, including the Congressional in-
telligence committees, the Agency's own general counsel or its
inspector general. Based on the Agency's denials of requests from the
ACLU and National Security Archive, it appears the CIA may not view
this language as clear. For example, the October 2006 request of the
National Security Archive for information on the Iraqi National Con-
gress explains that this information was cited in the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence's investigation into Iraqi intelligence. Such
an investigation clearly falls within the black-letter meaning of the
statute, but the CIA refused to acknowledge this.
With regard to the National Security Archive's September 2004
request for files cited in the 9/11 Commission report, again the CIA
failed to acknowledge that the investigations that would trigger an ex-
ception to the 1984 Act. Although the 9/11 Commission itself does not
fit within the ambit of the 1984 Act, the Archive in its appeal to the
CIA argued the files it requested were also the specific subject matter
of an investigation by the Congressional intelligence committees.
Those investigations particularly the one which produced the "Report
of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," have relied on the same doc-
uments as the 9/11 Commission.
The appendix of the House hearings sheds light on whether
these types of files can be released. The House Intelligence Committee
submitted a series of questions to the CIA, asking if the Agency would
release certain files under the proposed law. For example, the commit-
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tee asked the CIA if a "Formal Memorandum on Respective
Responsibilities of the FBI and CIA in the United States," that was
dated February 7, 1966 and was referred to on page 57 of the Rockefel-
ler Commission report, would be released under the 1984 Act. 127 The
CIA responded, "This category of documents describes a memo that
was examined by the Rockefeller Commission and referred to in the
report of that Commission. Since material that was transmitted to an
official investigatory body in the course of conducting an investigation
into an illegal or improper intelligence activity will continue to be ac-
cessible to search and review, the types of documents described in this
category will remain accessible." 128 This answer implies that any doc-
ument which was provided to an investigating body will be subject to
release, not just documents which are finally considered by the body.
This interpretation provides a broader basis for requesters to draw
parallels between the documents they are seeking and the Agency's an-
swer to this question, particularly in court.
There is the possibility of judicial review under the statute.
The availability of judicial review of the CIA's administration of
the 1984 Act was one of the more contentious issues before Congress.
Agency and Department of Justice officials testified at the Congres-
sional hearings that such review would undermine the law and lead to
ill-equipped judges making significant decisions related to national se-
curity. 129 Once again, Congress rejected the Agency's position and
provided in the statute for limited judicial review. The statute re-
quires that in most situations, the court review the requested
information ex parte and in camera, and rely substantially on the
sworn statements of the parties. Furthermore, in cases where the
plaintiff argues the records are improperly deemed operational files,
the plaintiff must make such an assertion with a statement based on
personal knowledge or other admissible evidence. 130 Furthermore, if
the plaintiff argues the CIA is not properly applying an exemption to
the Act, the agency can meet its burden of proof with a sworn state-
ment that the files in question fall within the statute's definition of
operational files.' 3 ' The statute also significantly limits discovery; the
only traditional tool discovery tool available are requests for admis-
127. Id. at 123.
128. Id. at 116.
129. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 23.
130. 50 U.S.C. § 431(f)(l)-(3) (2007).
131. 50 U.S.C. § 431(f)(4)(A) (2007).
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sions. 132 This means there are no interrogatories, depositions, or
requests for production of documents. The court may only order the
CIA to search and review its operational files and release responsive
portions.
133
Although this review is much more limited than in other areas
of the law, particularly compared to FOIA which provides for de novo
review of an agency's decisions, it imposes more judicial review than
CIA officials desired. In initial hearings before the Senate intelligence
committee, the CIA's deputy general counsel presented the view that
the bill as written at that point did not provide for judicial review of a
decision by the Director of Central Intelligence (now the Director of
National Intelligence) to designate a particular set of files as ex-
empt.'34 "Quite frankly, any other interpretation, I think would turn
this legislation on its head, because if every time the designation by
the DCI were challenged in court, we would be right where we started,"
he said.135 Subsequently, the Justice Department's intelligence policy
counsel also testified against any judicial review citing the inability of
a judge to make decisions which effect national security, saying, "It
would very difficult, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, for a court which
has no knowledge of or experience with the CIA filing system to sec-
ond-guess the Director on a description of whether the files fit the
statutory definition."'
3 6
Additionally, John Moore, a law professor at the University of
Virginia, an expert in national security, represented the American Bar
Association before the Senate committee. He said he believed judicial
review was inappropriate, in part because of the policy implications it
may have. 137 "The real cost of judicial review is one of the perceptions
or misperceptions that we are creating with respect to the potential to
operate within the intelligence community and maintain the secrecy of
actions," he told the Senate committee. 138 He added rather dramati-
cally, "I have no difficultly in saying what the law ought to be in this
case is no reviewability whatsoever."139 Professor Moore explained his
fear was that a court could confuse whether provision of the 1984 Act,
132. 50 U.S.C. § 431(f)(5) (2007).
133. 50 U.S.C. § 431(f)(6) (2007).
134. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 23.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 103.
139. Id.
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FOIA or the National Security Act applied and that the possibility of
such a review could have a "chilling effect on intelligence. 14 °
Unsurprisingly, the ACLU and committee members believed
differently. Senator Dave Durenberger scoffed, for practical reasons,
at the suggestion the only oversight for the CIA's actions with regard
to the 1984 Act may be from the Congressional intelligence commit-
tees. "I have the least amount of faith in the oversight that comes from
those before whom you are testifying today because by the time a mat-
ter reaches our attention, it probably has reached everyone else's in
the world."14 1 The ACLU also lobbied for judicial review, arguing that
there must be some sort of oversight for the CIA.
142
However, neither the judicial review provisions in House nor
Senate bills became the final language of the law which changed dur-
ing conference. Both the House and Senate bills focused on the CIA's
need to issue regulations for operational files, and provided a court to
review whether the Agency followed those regulations. 143 Thus, unlike
with other sections of the bill, there is little useful legislative history
concerning judicial review. Indeed, the floor debate from the Congres-
sional Record, in which several senators urged final passage of the
House bill, does not reference the topic of judicial review.
144
To some degree, the Agency's concern for judicial review has
gone unfounded - there have been few cases reviewing the CIA refus-
als to release records. There has also been little Congressional
oversight on this issue. What is not possible to know, at least for the
general public, is the extent to which the possibility of judicial review
may have stifled the Agency's sources as it suggest.
Nevertheless, the language of the law clearly provides for judi-
cial review and relief in court, but that provision has seldom been
invoked. There are only a handful of cases interpreting the 1984 Act,
almost of all which have been previously discussed. This suggests a
dearth of knowledge among FOIA requests regarding the 1984 Act. On
the CIA's FOIA Web site, generally the principal place for getting the
information necessary to make a FOIA request, the Agency tells re-
questers the 1984 Act "exempts from the search, review, and disclosure
provisions of the FOIA all operational records of the CIA maintained
140. S. 1324, supra note 15, at 103-104.
141. Id. at 103.
142. Id. at 74.
143. Legislation To Modify the Application of the Freedom of Information Act to the
Central Intelligence Agency Before the Subcomm. on Legis., of the H. Comm. on
Intelligence, supra, note 38, at 125. S. Rep. No. 98-305 at 1-4 (1984).
144. See 130 Cong. Rec. S27787-89.
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by its Directorate of Operations, its Directorate of Science and Technol-
ogy, and its Office of Security."145 The Agency does not explain the
exemptions to the Act, the judicial review rights. Additionally, in some
rejections to the National Security Archive FOIA requests for opera-
tional files, the CIA has not advised the requestor of their
administrative appeal rights. Together, these tactics offer some expla-
nation for the small number suits brought under the Act.
Arguing for release of operational files within the current statutory
interpretations is still possible.
When the statutory language is still broadly considered, the re-
quester is best served, given these interpretations of the 1984 Act, by
making a broad request for files which relate to a specific investigation
by either the Agency's general counsel, inspector general or one of the
Congressional intelligence committees. Such a broad request, while
possibly producing more information than is required, will safely place
the request within the "specific subject matter" framework and allow
the requester to search the files received for the relevant information.
In addition, if such a request is denied, it is possible to argue the files
the Agency considers "operational" are in fact not. Finally, the re-
quester should argue for the widest possible judicial review, stressing
Congress's concern that without it there will be no effective oversight
of the Agency.
CONCLUSION
Despite the enactment of the CIA Information Act of 1984,
much of the CIA's files remain open for review under FOIA. This is
true even for the exempted operational files - particularly those which
have been the subject of an investigation. The exemption means those
files containing the most controversial information, the most interest-
ing, and the most likely to shed light on the government's activities are
available. While the Agency has not responded favorably to request for
operational files, the courts, particularly in ACLU v. DOD1 46, have
been kinder. The time is ripe for more litigation surrounding this is-
sue, especially as more probes are made into the Agency's post 9/11
actions.
The legislative history of the CIA Information Act can also be
used forcefully in lawsuits if directed at other intelligence agencies
145. CIA: The Freedom of Information Act, http://www.foia.cia.gov/foia.asp.
146. See ACLU v. DOD, supra note 80, at 265.
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such as the DIA, the NGA, the NSA, and the NRO which now have
similar provisions. With the ongoing nature of the war in Iraq and
operations in Afghanistan, the focus cannot remain solely on the CIA's
actions but should be expanded. These agencies hold a wide variety of
files and are likely to be no less forthcoming with them than the CIA
has been.
Finally, the legislative history of the CIA Information Act
should be used to prevent the continued enactment of similar laws
aimed at the intelligence community. As Congress is increasingly con-
cerned with FOIA and improving compliance government wide with
the law as it seeks to amend it, Congress should not be undermining
itself by enacting other statutes exempting agencies from FOIA. A uni-
fied policy is important in furthering the overall goals of FOIA. The
primary purpose of the 1984 Act - to provide timelier processing of
FOIA requests and eliminate the Agency's backlog- should not be for-
gotten. As the federal government continues to have significant
backlogs of FOIA requests, including at the CIA, it is apparent the
Agency is not keeping its promise to Congress to work quickly to pro-
cess the requests it receives. Congress must exercise its oversight
power to enhance Agency compliance with the 1984 Act.
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